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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Alvarez-Machain,1 the United States Supreme
Court in reversing the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit2
held that the non-consensual abduction of a Mexican citizen from
Mexican territory by U.S. law enforcement officers did not violate the
United States-Mexico extradition treaty.3 In applying the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine,4 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-standing principle
that jurisdiction over the defendant is not impaired when the defend-
ant is forcibly abducted and brought before the court.-
The Alvarez-Machain decision has sparked a firestorm of interna-
tional controversy. Foreign governments throughout Latin America,
as well as the government of Canada, have denounced it.6 The opin-
ion has also been widely criticized by the media and the academic
legal community as sanctioning government-sponsored international
kidnapping.7 Members of Congress have further expressed their dis-
dain over the Supreme Court ruling, and legislation has been intro-
duced that would effectively overturn the result.8 The Alvarez-
1. 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
2. 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991).
3. 112 S. Ct. at 2190; see Extradition reaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.
4. See Kerv. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), reh'g
denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).
5. 112 S. Ct. at 2192-93.
6. The Presidents of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay issued
a declaration on June 26, 1992, expressing their concern with the decision and requesting
that the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organization of American States issue
an opinion on the international juridical validity of the Alvarez-Machain decision. In addi-
tion, on June 15, 1992, the government of Colombia issued a statement that the Alvarez-
Machain decision imperils the legal stability of all treaties. The Canadian Minister of Ex-
ternal Affairs in a statement before the Canadian Parliament stated that any attempt by
the United States to kidnap someone in Canada would be regarded as a criminal act. See
Kidnapping Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Civil and Constitutional Rights Sub-
comm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 111-12,114 (1992) (state-
ment of Alan J. Kreczko, Deputy Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State) [hereinafter
Kidnapping Suspects Abroad: Hearings].
7. Tony Mauro, Foreign Kidnapping Upheld: Ruling A Global "Hunting License,"
USA TODAY, June 16, 1992, at Al; Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court's Insult to Law-
Abiding Countries, L.A. TiJms, June 21, 1992, at M1; Court: U.S. Can Kidnap Foreigners,
PHIL. INQUIRER, June 16, 1992, at Al; see also Abraham Abramovsky, Extraterritorial
Abductions: America's "Catch and Snatch" Policy Run Amok, 31 VA. J. IrNr'L L. 150
(1991); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Still More on Kidnapping, 85 Am. J. INT'L L. 655 (1991).
8. The House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights held hear-
ings on the case one week after it was decided. Under a bill sponsored by former Con-
gressman Leon Panetta, which was entitled the International Kidnapping and Extradition
Teaty Enforcement Act of 1992, U.S. courts would be divested of jurisdiction over a de-
fendant forcibly abducted from a foreign country that has in effect an extradition treaty
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Machain decision, however, has been grossly distorted by its detrac-
tors. Alvarez-Machain does not, as its critics maintain, give federal
law enforcement officers a "green light" or "license" to kidnap foreign
fugitives anywhere in the world. Moreover, the Supreme Court did
not hold that the United States may ignore and violate with impunity
the express terms of an extradition treaty to which it is a party, nor did
the Court sanction the violation of customary international law.
In Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court analyzed the extradition
treaty between the United States and Mexico and held that the forci-
ble apprehension of a foreign fugitive from the territory of Mexico
was not prohibited by the express terms of the treaty.9 The Court
expressly rejected respondent Alvarez-Machain's argument that the
treaty provides the exclusive means by which a defendant can be
brought within the jurisdiction of the United States. Holding that the
forcible abduction of Alvarez-Machain did not violate the extradition
treaty, the Court stressed that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine is therefore
controlling, and "the Court need not inquire as to how respondent
came before it."'10
The Alvarez-Machain case, however, raises more than simply an
issue of treaty construction and interpretation. Rather, the forcible
abduction of a foreign national from foreign soil by U.S. law enforce-
ment agents raises several complex international legal issues and pol-
icy questions. First, to what extent may the United States resort to
self-help to apprehend international drug kingpins, state-sponsored
terrorists, and organized crime figures that threaten the sovereignty
and domestic security of the United States? Second, to what extent is
unilateral action limited or prohibited by customary international
law? Moreover, what recourse, if any, is afforded the United States
when the foreign government refuses to extradite or prosecute inter-
national criminals because it either fears terrorist reprisals" or has
with the United States, absent the consent of the foreign sovereign. See H.R. 5565, 102d
Cong., 2d Sess. 101-02 (1992).
The American Bar Association (ABA) House of Delegates adopted a recommenda-
tion that federal and state law enforcement authorities should "fully respect international
law" when dealing with the rendition of fugitives from foreign countries by extradition or
otherwise. The resolution was backed by the Criminal Justice and International Law and
Practice Sections of the ABA in reaction to Ahvarez-Machain. Extradition, 52 Cnrj4. L.
REP. (BNA) 1431 (Feb. 17, 1993).
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2193-95.
10. Id. at 2193.
11. Pablo Escobar, the former head of the infamous Medellin Cartel, is believed to
have been responsible for the assassination of Colombian Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara-
Bonilla on April 30, 1984, in retaliation for stepped-up law enforcement efforts against the
1994]
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determined that cooperation with the United States would not be in
its best political interest?' 2 Must the United States simply sit idly by
and permit international criminals to go free? Finally, if the foreign
state fails to prosecute or extradite and, in the more egregious case,
aids and abets the international terrorists by providing a sanctuary
from prosecution, is the asylum state in violation of the internationally
imposed duty to prosecute and punish criminal offenders within its
territory as well as the duty to protect a state's nationals within its
border?
The facts surrounding the Alvarez-Machain case, including the
kidnapping and sadistic torture-murder of Special Agent Enrique
"Kiki" Camarena-Salazar of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) abroad, the dismal lack of cooperation by the Mexican
government to bring Camarena's assailants to justice, coupled with ev-
idence of complicity by high-level Mexican government officials in
Camarena's murder, make a compelling case for extraordinary rendi-
tion under narrowly defined circumstances. Part II of this Article will
Medellin Cartel. See ELAINE SHANNON, DESPERADOS-LATIN DRUG LoRDs, U.S.
LAWMEN, AND THE VAR AMERICA CAN'T WIN 138-76 (1988). In August 1992, Escobar
was indicted in the Eastern District of New York for the killing of 110 passengers, including
two Americans, stemming from the 1989 bombing of an Avianca Airlines jetliner. United
States v. Pablo Escobar, No. CR91-1285(s) (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1992). Robert C. Bonner,
who served as the Administrator of the DEA from 1990 to 1993, stated that Escobar's
motivation may have been to flex the drug cartel's muscle. "It may have been a retaliation
against the Colombian government, an attempt to show them who's boss," he noted. Rob-
ert Davis & Bruce Frankel, Terrorism Added To Escobar's List, USA TODAY, Aug. 14,
1992, at 3A.
Escobar was indicted in 7 cities, including Miami, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. He
was also indicted in Louisiana for the murder of DEA informant Barry Seal. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, Top COLOMBIAN COCAINE
VIOLATORS 14 (1991). Colombian officials refused all requests for Escobar's extradition or
surrender to the United States. Escobar escaped from prison in Colombia after bribing a
military officer and was recently killed in a firefight with Colombian military police. See
Robert D. McFadden, Head of Medellin Cocaine Cartel is Killed by Troops in Colombia,
N.Y. Ttlms, Dec. 3, 1993, at Al.
12. The Camarena case has been a continuing source of embarrassment to the Mexi-
can government. To date, 22 individuals have been indicted for their participation in the
kidnapping and murder of DEA Special Agent Camarena, including the former Director
of the Mexican Federal Police and the head of Mexican Interpol. United States v. Caro-
Quintero, 745 F. Supp. 599, 602 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affd sub. nom., United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 946 F.2d 1466 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992); High-Level Mexican
Ex-Officials Indicted in DEA Agent's Death, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1990, at AS [hereinafter
High-Level Mexican Ex-Officials]. This author believes that the prosecution of high-level
Mexican government officials for their participation in the Camarena murder and involve-
ment in narcotics trafficking would be politically embarrassing to the Mexican government.
Consequently, there is a strong disincentive for Mexico to agree to the extradition of any
Mexican nationals to the United States for prosecution.
[Vol. 17:457
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discuss the Alvarez-Machain decision. Part III will examine the gen-
eral duty imposed on a state under international law to act with due
diligence to prevent the commission of acts of terrorism as well as
other acts of violence directed against foreign nationals within the ju-
risdiction of the asylum state. Part IV will analyze the restraints on
the use of force extraterritorially and the exceptions to this general
proscription recognized under customary international law and the
United Nations Charter. Finally, Part V will set forth a legal frame-
work for the exercise of extraordinary rendition within narrowly de-
fined circumstances.
H. THE ALVAREZ-MA CHAIN DECISION
Humberto Alvarez-Machain, a citizen and resident of Mexico,
was indicted for the kidnapping and murder of U.S. DEA Special
Agent Camarena-Salazar.13 The U.S. government alleged that Alva-
13. 112 S. Ct. at 2190. Under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Prozedure, a
motion seldom granted by the court, the trial judge ruled after the close of the go'. em-
ment's case against Dr. Machain that the evidence was insufficient to allow the case to go
to the jury for deliberation. See David Schrieberg, Trail in Agent's Death )3Ta-sses Mcx-
'co's Elite, SACRA~MENTo BEE, Dec. 21, 1992, at Al; FED. R. CR.m. P. 29. While admittedly
the government's case against Dr. Machan was circumstantial, the trial court erred in dis-
missing the criminal charges. At trial, a number of government witnesses testified that Dr.
Machain was a member of the infamous Guadalajara narcotics cartel. An eyewitness teti-
fied that he saw Dr. Machain at the residence where Agent Camarena %%as being held. The
witness stated that Dr. Machain was seen with a medical bag and %%as cleaning medical
syringes in the kitchen of the residence. The witness's credibility %as further buttressed by
independent physical evidence introduced at trial, including a six cubic centimeter syringe
with traces of lidocaine that was found by FBI agents in the guest house of the residence
where Agent Camarena was tortured and interrogated. A medical doctor also testified at
the Alvarez-Machain trial that lidocaine is used to correct cardiac arrhythmia and to ease
pain. Fifteen latent fingerprints and six palm prints matching those of Dr. Machain %,ere
found at the residence. In Dr. Machain's post-arrest statements, he admitted to b.-ing at
the residence and on two occasions entering the room when Agent Camarena %was being
interrogated. On the second occasion, Dr. Machain stated that Agent Camarena had been
severely beaten and was near death. Finally, the torture.interrogation of Special Agent
Camarena was tape-recorded by his assailants. It is clear from the tapes that Agent
Camarena is moaning and shrieking in pain and at one point actually pleads with his cap-
tors to provide him with medical treatment for his wounds. See Government's Opposition
to Motion of Defendant Alvarez-Machan for Judgment of Acquittal Under Rule 29 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 12-22,
United States v. Caro-Quintero, No. CR 87-422(G)-ER (C.D. Cal. 1992) [hereinafter Gov-
ernment's Opposition].
Judge Rafeedie's Rule 29 ruling further reflects his criticism of the DEA's actions in
the Camarena investigation. In an earlier pre-trial ruling, Judge Rafeedie dismissed the
criminal charges against Alvarez-Machain holding that his forcible apprehension in Meico
by the DEA violated the United States-Mexico extradition treaty. United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1991). In the court's written decision,
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rez-Machain, a medical doctor, participated in the kidnapping and
murder by administering medication to Special Agent Camarena to
revive him and to keep him alive so that he could be further tortured 14
and interrogated. His assailants sought to elicit information regarding
DEA narcotics investigations in Mexico, the names of confidential in-
formants working for the DEA, and whether high-level officials in the
Mexican government had been implicated by the DEA in narcotics
trafficking.15
On April 2, 1990, Alvarez-Machain was forcibly abducted from
his medical office in Guadalajara, Mexico. It is conceded that Alva-
rez-Machain was abducted by Mexican police officers who were acting
at the request of the DEA and flown by private plane to El Paso,
Texas, where he was turned over to special agents of the DEA.16
Judge Rafeedie strongly admonished the DEA for bringing three of the Camarena defend-
ants before the jurisdiction of the court by means of extraordinary rendition and, in the
court's opinion, undermining respect for the rule of law. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at
615; see also Matta-Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v. Henman, 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ill. 1988),
affd, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990) (discussing abduction of Juan Ramon Matta-Balles-
teros); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct.
1056 (1990) (discussing abduction of defendant Rene-Verdugo Urquidez).
14. Agent Camarena's mutilated body was discovered approximately one month after
the kidnapping in an open field 60 miles outside of Guadalajara. Caro-Quintero, 745 F.
Supp. at 602. An autopsy on the body performed by U.S. Navy Captain, Dr. Gerald Spen-
cer, revealed that Agent Camarena had been savagely beaten, eight ribs had been frac-
tured (four on each side), both jaws had been fractured, and his skull had severe multiple
fractures. A blunt instrument, the "coup de grace," had been driven through the top of
Agent Camarena's skull. Trial Testimony of Dr. Gerald Spencer at 5-49 to 5-71, Caro-
Quintero, No. Cr 87-422(B)-ER (C.D. Cal. 1992); see also United States v. Lopez-Alvarez,
970 F.2d 583, 593 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 504 (1992).
15. At the first Camarena trial, it was established that Camarena's captors tape-re-
corded the torture-interrogation. The tape-recordings and transcripts of the interrogation
were introduced into evidence at trial. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 593. Evidence was
additionally adduced at trial that the motive for the kidnapping was the seizure by DEA
agents and Mexican police officials, three months earlier, of approximately 10,000 tons of
marijuana in Bufalo, Chihuahua. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, No. 91-50342, 1994
U.S. App. LEXIS 1200, at *16-17 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1994); Schrieberg, supra note 13, at Al;
Philip Shenon, U.S. Charges Nine in Mexico Death of a Drug Agent, N.Y. TImEs, Jan. 7,
1988, at Al; George B. Lake, Who Killed Kiki Camarena?, NAT'L REv., Aug. 29, 1986, at
34. High-level Mexican government officials were implicated in the vast marijuana opera-
tion. Agent Camarena was kidnapped and interrogated to determine what the DEA knew
about Mexican government corruption and involvement in narcotics trafficking. See Be-
lated Justice: Another Conviction in the Murder of a DEA Agent, TIME, Aug. 13, 1990, at 36.
On the same day Agent Camarena was kidnapped, Alfredo Zavala-Avelar, a DEA
informant who worked with Agent Camarena, was also abducted. Zavala-Avelar was also
brutally beaten and tortured. Zavala-Avelar's battered corpse was found alongside that of
Agent Camarena. United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200, 1203 (9th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2332 (1993).
16. 112 S. Ct. at 2190.
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Alvarez-Machain moved to dismiss the indictment first on
grounds that the forcible abduction by DEA agents constituted outra-
geous government conduct and, second, on grounds that his abduction
violated the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico
and thereby divested the district court of jurisdiction to try him. 17 The
district court denied the outrageous government action claim, but held
that Alvarez-Machain's abduction violated the extradition treaty and
the district court therefore lacked jurisdiction over him. The district
court dismissed the indictment against Alvarez-Machain and ordered
that he be repatriated to Mexico.18 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the indictment and the district
court's order to repatriate Alvarez-Machain, relying on its earlier de-
cision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.19
In analyzing whether the abduction of Alvarez-Machain from
Mexico divested the district court of jurisdiction over respondent,
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, analyzed the contin-
uing viability of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. In Ker v. Illinois,°3 Ker was
forcibly abducted from Peru and brought to the United States to stand
trial for larceny. Ker challenged the court's jurisdiction over him and
argued that he had a right under the extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru to be returned to the United States only in
accord with the terms of the treaty. The Supreme Court rejected
Ker's argument and held that "such forcible abduction is no sufficient
reason why the party should not answer when brought within the ju-
risdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an of-
fence, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court."21 In
Frisbie v. Collins,' the Supreme Court applied the Ker rule. Defend-
ant Collins had been kidnapped in Chicago by Michigan state police
officers and forcibly transported interstate to Michigan to stand trial.
The Supreme Court upheld the conviction over objections based on
17. Id.
18. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 601.
19. 939 F.2d at 1341. In January 19S6, Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquid2z, a citizcn and
resident of Mexico, was apprehended in Mexico by Mexican police officera and trans-
ported to the United States, where he was surrendered to the custody of the U.S. Marshal.
In January 1988, a federal grand jury returned a five count second superscding indictment
charging Verdugo-Urquidez with multiple criminal violations, including the kidnapping
and murder of Agent Camarena. Verdugo-Urquidez was eventually convicted for the
Camarena murder. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990), reh'g
denied, 494 U.S. 1092 (1990). See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
20. 119 U.S. 436 (186).
21. Id. at 441, 444.
22. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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the due process clause and the federal kidnapping statute. In holding
that the jurisdiction of the court was not impaired by the forcible in-
terstate abduction of the defendant, Justice Black, speaking for a
unanimous Court, stated:
This Court has never departed from the rule announced in [Ker]
that the power of a court to try a person for a crime is not impaired
by the fact that he had been brought within the court's jurisdiction
by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' No persuasive reasons are now
presented to justify overruling this line of cases. They rest on the
sound basis that due process of law is satisfied when one present in
court is convicted of a crime after having been fairly apprized [sic]
of the charges against him and after a fair trial in accordance with
constitutional procedural safeguards. There is nothing in the Con-
stitution that requires a court to permit a guilty person rightfully
convicted to escape justice because he was brought to trial against
his will. 3
The Alvarez-Machain Court emphasized that if the abduction of
respondent Alvarez-Machain is not prohibited under the extradition
treaty between the United States and Mexico, then "the rule in Ker
applies and the court need not inquire as to how respondent came
before it."'2 4 The Court then proceeded to analyze the terms of the
extradition treaty. The Court first noted that the treaty is silent on the
obligation of the parties to refrain from forcible abductions from the
territory of the other nation.25 In addition, the Court emphasized that
the treaty fails to set forth any sanctions or remedies in the event such
an abduction occurs.26
Alvarez-Machain argued that article 9 of the treaty specifies the
exclusive means by which the requesting nation may gain custody of a
foreign national from the foreign country for the purposes of prosecu-
23. Id. at 522.
24. 112 S. Ct. at 2193; see F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Ab-
ducted in Breach of International Law, in INTRNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERuLEX1T
407, 414 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989) ("With rare unanimity and undeniable justification the
courts of the world have held that the manner in which an accused has been brought before
the court does not and, indeed, cannot deprive it of its jurisdiction .....
25. 112 S. Ct. at 2193.
26. Id. While not addressed by the Supreme Court in Alvarez-Machain, at least one
commentator has suggested that both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that repatriation of respondent Alvarez-Machain was the
required remedy for a violation of the extradition treaty. Malvina Halberstam, In Defense
of the Supreme Court Decision in Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 736,737 n.7, 737-38
(1992).
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tion.? He contended that pursuant to article 9, neither country is
bound to deliver up its own nationals.2s Extradition, he maintained, is
wholly discretionary under the treaty.2 9 Under article 9, if extradition
is not granted, the requested party shall submit the case for prosecu-
tion locally.30 If Mexico refuses to extradite or prosecute locally, the
United States is limited by the treaty and is without any further
recourse.31
In rejecting the proposed "exclusive means" reading of the extra-
dition treaty, the Court construed the treaty as simply providing spe-
cific procedures to be followed when, and if, extradition was
requested by either party. The Court opined:
Extradition treaties exist so as to impose mutual obligations to sur-
render individuals in certain defined sets of circumstances, following
established procedures. The treaty thus provides a mechanism
which would not otherwise exist, requiring under certain circum-
stances, the United States and Mexico to extradite individuals to the
other country, and establishing the procedures to be followed when
the treaty is invoked. 2
The Supreme Court then turned to the history of negotiation and
practice under the treaty. The Court found particularly instructive the
fact that the Mexican government was made aware, as early as 1906,
of the rule in Ker.?3 The treaty signed in 1978, however, does not in
any way attempt to limit the Ker doctrine.34 In addition, the Court
27. 112 S. Ct. at 2193. Article 9 of the treaty provides:
1. Neither contracting party shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but
the executive authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the las
of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its discretion, it b- deemed
proper to do so.
2. If extradition is not granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the re-
quested party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over the offense.
Extradition Treaty, supra note 3, art. 9, 31 U.S.T. at 5056.
28. 112 S. CL at 2193-94.
29. Id. at 2194.
30. Id at 2193.
31. Id. at 2194.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. In 1905, a Mexican national was abducted from Mexico and brought to the United
States to stand trial. The Mexican Charg6 %vrote the Secretary of State protesting the forci-
ble abduction and arguing that the abduction was made outside of the procedures set forth
in the extradition treaty. Letter from Balbino Devalos, Charg6 of the Mexican Embassy,
to Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of State (June 11, 1906), reprinted in PArcERs Rr-LAnt,,
TO =H FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, I.R. Doe. No. 1, 59th Cong,, 2d
Sess., pL 2, at 1121-22 (1906). In his reply, Bacon defended the forcible abduction, empha-
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emphasized that language that would have divested the federal courts
of jurisdiction in forcible abduction cases was drafted as early as 1935
by a group of legal scholars sponsored by the faculty of Harvard Law
School, but was never included in the current treaty. 5
Having concluded that neither the language of the treaty nor its
history supports the proposition that the treaty prohibits abductions
outside of its terms, the Supreme Court turned to the question of
whether the treaty should be interpreted to include such a prohibition
as an implied term.3 6 Alvarez-Machain argued that international ab-
ductions are so clearly violative of customary international law that
there was no reason to include such a prohibition in the treaty itself.3 7
In support of this position, he cited United States v. Rauscher,38 in
which the Court implied as a term of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty
of 1842,19 which governed extraditions between the United Kingdom
and the United States, the doctrine of specialty, which prohibits the
prosecution of the defendant for a crime other than the crime for
which he had been extradited. In rejecting Alvarez-Machain's argu-
ment and distinguishing Rauscher, the Court stated: "In Rauscher, we
implied a term in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty because of the prac-
tice of nations with regards to extradition treaties. In the instant case,
respondent would imply terms in the extradition treaty from the prac-
tice of nations with regards to international law more generally. 40
The Court also found as unpersuasive the general international
law principles cited by Alvarez-Machain and, without more, refused to
read into the treaty as an implied term a general principle of interna-
sizing that the issue had been decided by the Supreme Court in Ker. Letter from Robert
Bacon, Acting Secretary of State, to Balbino Devalos, Charg6 of the Mexican Embassy
(June 22, 1906), reprinted in PAPERS RELATINo TO FOREIGN RELATIONS OF ThE UNI1ED
STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 1, 59th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1121-22 (1906).
35. In article 16 of the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, an
international convention on extradition, the Advisory Committee of the Harvard Research
in International Law proposed the following language be adopted:
In exercising jurisdiction under this Convention, no State shall prosecute or pun-
ish any person who has been brought within its territory or a place subject to its
authority by recourse to measures in violation of international law or interna-
tional convention without first obtaining the consent of the State or States whose
rights have been violated by such measures.
Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to
Crime, 29 Am. J. IN'L L. 435, 442 (Supp. 1935).
36. 112 S. Ct. at 2195.
37. Id. at 2196.
38. 119 U.S. 407, 417-23 (1886).
39. Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, Aug. 9, 1842, 8 Stat. 572, 576.
40. 112 S. Ct. at 2195-96.
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tional law that one government may not "exercise its police power in
the territory of another state.' Fimally, the Court left open the issue
whether the forcible apprehension of Alvarez-Machain was a viola-
tion of international law.42
The dissent in a harshly worded opinion criticized the majority's
narrow reading of the extradition treaty that absent an explicit prohi-
bition in the treaty to the contrary, the parties are free to engage in
forcible government kidnapping in the territory of the other nation.43
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, stated that an analogous argu-
ment had been rejected by the Supreme Court in Rauscher. In that
case, the Court implied as a term of the treaty between the United
States and the United Kingdom the doctrine of specialty absent any
express language in the treaty limiting the extraditing nation's author-
ity to prosecute the defendant for only those crimes for which he had
been extradited. 44
The dissent was equally critical of the majority's reliance on Ker
v. Illinois.45 The dissent reasoned that Ker involved conduct by a pri-
vate citizen, which does not violate any treaty obligation, while Ah'a-
rez-Machain involved a government-sponsored abduction, which
Justice Stevens maintained constitutes a "flagrant violation of interna-
tional law." The dissent accused the government of showing disdain
for the "Rule of Law" that the Court has a duty to uphold.47 The
41. Id. at 2196.
42. With no discussion or elaboration the Court stated, "Respondent and his amid
may be correct that respondent's abduction was 'shocking,'. . . and that it may t2 in %iola-
tion of general international law principles." Id.
43. Id. at 2198-99.
44. Id. at 2201 (citing Rauscher, 119 U.S. at 422).
45. Id. at 2197.
46. Id. at 2203; see RESTATEwNT (THiRD) OF FoRucG4 RrL\I~iG3 Lv. --11L
UNIrED STATES § 432(2) (1987). The Restatement states in part: "A state's lav. enforc.-
ment officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only %ith the
consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state," Id,
It should be noted that the federal district court never ruled on the cutomary interna-
tional law issue and, instead, based its decision on a violation of the Extradition Treaty.
See Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 614.
47. 112 S. Ct. 2205. One commentator has suggested just the contrar : "Prozcibing
terrorist acts and punishing terrorists helps to establish the rule of law and emphasizcs the
criminal nature of the terrorist act." D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Trroritsi5 Ccrscs
for Trial in the United States: Issues of International and Domestic La;., 23 Tv:. Nha'L LJ.
1, 50 (1988); see also Jeffrey A. McCredie, Contemporary Uses of Force Against Tcrrorism:
The United States Response to Achille Lauro-Questions of Jurisdiction and Its Evcrcise, Io
GA. J. INTL & CoNWi. L. 435, 467 (1986).
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dissent characterized the DEA's conduct as motivated by "revenge" 48
and described the majority opinion (not the crime) as "monstrous. 49
The dissent, although obviously concerned with respect for Mex-
ico's territorial sovereignty and respect for the rule of law, fails to ac-
knowledge or fully appreciate the legitimate and compelling federal
interests at stake in the instant case. If a federal agent can be kid-
napped and brutally murdered and the assailants evade apprehension
and prosecution, this breeds lawlessness, invites continued violence,
and thereby endangers the lives and safety of all federal agents
abroad.50 The threat of prosecution and incarceration in the United
States serve as strong deterrents in preventing hostile attacks against
federal law enforcement officers and other U.S. citizens overseas.-"
This deterrent value, however, is lost when the foreign state fails to
prosecute locally, refuses to extradite and, instead, harbors the foreign
fugitive to prevent prosecution in the United States.52
International law further imposes a duty on the state to protect
the safety of foreign nationals within its borders-here, Special Agent
Camarena.53 A breach of this duty likewise constitutes a violation of
It is difficult to comprehend how the "rule of law" and the interests of justice are
served by standing idly by and permitting a fugitive to avoid apprehension and seek refuge
from prosecution and punishment within the territorial borders of a foreign state.
48. 112 S. Ct. at 2205.
49. Id. at 2206.
50. DEA agents are currently stationed in 43 countries. In August 1986, in an incident
frighteningly reminiscent of that involving Camarena, DEA Special Agent Victor Cortez
was arrested in Guadalajara, Mexico by Mexican police officers, charged under a pretext
with illegal possession of firearms, and taken to Jalisco state police headquarters where he
was tortured for six hours with beatings and electric prods. Like Camarena, DEA Agent
Cortez was interrogated on DEA operations in Mexico. See Harry Anderson, Drugs and
Torture in Mexico, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 25, 1986, at 42; Pico Iyer, The Hunters Become the
Hunted: American Drug Agents Come Under Verbal and Physical Attack, TIMtE, Sept. 8,
1986, at 40; see also United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 1984) (de-
fendant Armando Benitez was tried and convicted on one count of conspiracy to murder
and two counts of assaulting with a deadly weapon two DEA agents in Colombia engaged
in the performance of their official duties under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 112, 1114, and 1117).
51. See Findlay, supra note 47, at 29. "[T]he apprehension, prosecution, and punish-
ment of terrorists would prevent future attacks by particular terrorists involved and deter
other terrorists from targeting United States citizens. Indeed, to allow terrorists to con-
tinue harming United States citizens would invite further terrorist attacks." Id.
52. See McCredie, supra note 47, at 466 (noting that "[u]nenforced prohibitions
against violent acts present a danger to the world community by encouraging future
terrorism").
53. Jordan J. Paust, The Link Between Human Rights and Terrorism and Its Implica-
tions for the Law of State Responsibility, 11 HASTINGS L.-r'L & COMip. L. REV. 41, 48-53
(1987); Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens
Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 Am. U. L. Rnv. 217, 276-307 (1977).
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international law.54 Under this general international duty, a state is
required to act with "due diligence" to prevent the commission of acts
of violence and terrorism within its jurisdiction. -" A breach of this
duty may result from either affirmative acts (government-sponsored
terrorism) or acts of omission (failure to apprehend, prosecute, pun-
ish, or extradite) by the foreign state.56 The critical question is what
remedy or recourse is afforded the United States, or any nation, when
a foreign country breaches its duty of due diligence under interna-
tional law.
While the right of territorial sovereignty is viewed, and rightfully
so, as paramount under international law, this right is not absolute.57
Customary international law recognizes the right of a nation to inter-
vene to protect the safety of its nationals abroad.5- The law of nations
further sanctions the extraterritorial application of a nation-state's
criminal laws to protect and preserve vital national interests.5P More-
over, Congress has frequently extended the reach of federal criminal
statutes extraterritorially in order to prevent and punish terrorists at-
tacks against American nationals abroad.60
The thesis of this Article is that where the safety of American
nationals abroad is jeopardized by the failure of the foreign state to
act with due diligence to prevent the commission of violent attacks
against U.S. nationals by apprehending, prosecuting, punishing, or ex-
traditing the international criminals, or where the foreign state
harbors and thereby aids and abets international fugitives, the state's
interests in protecting its nationals abroad are superior and must take
precedence over foreign territorial sovereignty. This limited foreign
intervention is not only justifiable, but consistent with international
54. One commentator has suggested that "[a] State should be equally culpable as an
accessory-after-the-fact if it permits free entry or safe passage w~hen theoretically subject to
international responsibility to punish or extradite terrorists." William Slomansun, LCJ.
Damages: Tort Remedy for Failure to Punish or Extradite International Terrorists, 5 CAL.
W. INT'L LJ. 121, 125 (1974).
55. See MeCredie, supra note 47, at 453.
56. See Lillich & Paxinan, supra note 53, at 308-09.
57. See D.W. BoWErr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL L.w 9-91 (195s).
58. See Findlay, supra note 47, at 25-29; McCredie, supra note 47, at 461-65.
59. See CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKEsLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTIERWAT N AL Lx w,
AND TIM PROTECTION OF HuziAN LIERTY (1992).
60. The Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 19I, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331 (Supp. IV 1987), expressly provides for "Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over Terrorist
Acts Abroad Against United States Nationals."
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law.6 ' International law does not require the United States to "submit
supinely to terror."'62
m. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOSTILE ACTS
DIRECTED AGAINST THE NATIONALS OF
ANOTHER STATE
On January 7, 1988, at a press conference held in Los Angeles,
U.S. Department of Justice officials announced the filing of a federal
grand jury indictment charging nine Mexican nationals with complic-
ity in the kidnapping and torture-murder of DEA Special Agent
Camarena. DEA Administrator John C. Lawn stated that the cooper-
ative trust between Mexican and U.S. law enforcement agents had
been fatally compromised in the Camarena case. Lawn remarked, "In
what we do for a living we depend on the integrity of our law enforce-
ment counterparts. In the case of Kiki Camarena, that mutual trust
failed."63
Lawn was referring to the fact that named in the federal indict-
ment were three Mexican police officials. Defendant Sergio Espino-
Verdin, a Comandante with the Mexican Federal Judicial Police, was
alleged to have interrogated Special Agent Camarena while he was
being tortured.'4 First Comandante Armando Pavon-Reyes, the fed-
eral police comandante in charge of the Mexican investigation, was
charged in the federal indictment with accepting a $261,000 bribe from
drug kingpin Rafael Caro-Quintero, the chief suspect in the
Camarena murder, and permitting Caro-Quintero to flee Guadalajara
61. Article 55 of the United Nations Charter provides: "The United Nations shall pro-
mote.., universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental values."
U.N. CHARTER art. 55. The respect for "human rights" referred to in article 55 certainly
includes the protection and safety of U.S. citizens abroad and the prevention of kidnap-
ping, torture, and murder.
62. See McCredie, supra note 47, at 458 (quoting former U.N. Ambassador Jean
Kirkpatrick).
63. William R. Doerner, Latin America; Flames of Anger; Washington Heats Up Its
War Against Drugs South of the Border, TIME, Jan. 18, 1988, at 28; Shenon, supra note 15,
at Al. As the federal prosecutor in charge of the Camarena prosecution at the time, the
author participated in the Department of Justice press conference announcing the filing of
the federal grand jury indictment.
64. At the first Camarena trial, tape-recordings of the interrogation of Agent
Camarena were played to the jury and introduced into evidence. Ex-Officer Guilty in
Death of Agent, N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 23, 1988, at A24. On the tapes, Special Agent
Camarena refers to his interrogator as "Comandante" and pleads with the "Comandante"
to spare his life. At trial, Comandante Espino-Verdin was identified on the interrogation
tapes as one of Camarena's interrogators. See Doerner, supra note 63, at 28.
[Vol. 17:457
Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad
by private jet in full view of three DEA agents.6" Finally, defendant
Raul Lopez-Alvarez, one of the three defendants convicted in the first
Camarena trial, was a Mexican state police officer at the time of the
abduction who aided and abetted in the kidnapping. 6
At the press conference, U.S. Attorney Robert C. Bonner set
forth what has been, and continues to be, the single objective of the
Department of Justice in the Camarena investigation: "Our first and
foremost concern is that justice is done. If justice is done in Mexico,
so be it."'67 Unfortunately, justice has not been done in Mexico. Since
the date of that historic press conference in Los Angeles, twenty-two
Mexican nationals have been indicted in the United States and
charged with complicity in the kidnapping and murder of Camarena.
Twelve of the Mexican defendants are fugitives believed to be residing
(not hiding) in Mexico. Added to that infamous list are former high-
level Mexican government officials, including the former Director of
the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (MFJP), the former Commander
of Operaci6n Pacffico, the federales' anti-drug unit, and the brother-
65. After the Mexican federal police detained Caro-Quintero at the Guadalajara Air-
port, DEA Agent Salvador Leyva, who testified at the Camarena trial, stated that he fol-
lowed Comandante Pavon-Reyes into a hangar at the airport and overheard him place a
telephone call to his supervisor. DEA officials suspect that Comandante Pavon-Reyes
called Manuel Ibarra-Herrera, director of the Mexican Federal Police (%%hich is equivalent
to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), to obtain authorization to accept
the bribe and permit Caro-Quintero to flee. See Doerner, supra note 63, at 28.
It is a cruel irony that the Mexican police official assigned the responsibility of sup-.r-
vising the Mexican criminal investigation and tracking down Agent Camarena's killers al-
legedly aided and abetted Camarena's assailants and assisted in securing their esicape.
66. To date, there have been three trials in the Camarena case. At the first trial, a
federal jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts against defendants Rene Verdugo.Ur-
quidez, Raul Lopez-Alvarez, and Jesus Felix-Gutierrez. Defendant Vardugo-Urquidez %vas
sentenced to 240 years plus life in prison; defendant Lopez-Alvarez receihed a sentence of
250 years plus life in prison; and defendant Felix-Gutierrez w~as sentenced to 10 years, the
maximum sentence provided under federal law for an accessory-after-the-fact. See United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 939 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 29sb 11992);
United States v. Felix-Gutierrez, 940 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2332
(1993); United States v. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
504 (1992) (charges for the kidnapping and murder of Agent Camarena were affirmed, but
charges for the murder of confidential informant Alfredo Zavala-Avelar %%ere reverzd).
At the second trial, defendants Ruben Zuno-Arce, Juan Ramon Matta-Ballesteros, and
Juan Jose Bernabe-Ramirez were found guilty of the kidnapping and murder. Ex-Guard
Convicted for the Kidnapping of a Federal Agent, N.Y. TMES, July 31, 1990, at A14; Central
Figure is Convicted in '85 Killing of Drug Agent, N.Y. TiNms, Aug. 1, 1990, at A10, At the
third trial, the district court dismissed the criminal charges against Alvarez-Machain. See
supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Seth Mydans, Judge Clears Mexican in
Agent's Killing, N.Y. Ttsms, Dec. 15, 1992, at A20. Ruben Zuno-Arce, hoawever, was con-
victed for the murder. Et Cetera: The Other Verdict, Ti~it, Jan. 4, 1993, at 11.
67. Doerner, supra note 63, at 28; Shenon, supra note 15, at AlS.
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in-law of the former President of Mexico, Luis Echeverria-Alvarez. 6
To date, no high-level Mexican government official has been prose-
cuted in Mexico for the murder of Agent Camarena,69 and the former
MFJP Director and the former head of the Mexican anti-drug unit
reside openly in Mexico, apparently without fear or threat of prosecu-
tion by the Mexican government.70 The Mexican government has
been sharply criticized for its lack of diligence and cooperation in the
criminal investigation.71
68. In December 1992, defendant Ruben Zuno-Arce was convicted by a federal jury in
Los Angeles for his role in planning Agent Camarena's kidnapping and being present
when Camarena was tortured and interrogated. Et Cetera; The Other Verdict, supra note
66, at 11; see also Busting the Brass: The U.S. Indicts Top Mexicans in the Camarena Case,
TiM, Feb. 12, 1990 [hereinafter Busting the Brass]; High-Level Mexican Ex-Officials, supra
note 12, at A5.
69. Despite repeated promises and assurances by Mexican government officials that if
released and repatriated to Mexico, Alvarez-Machain would be prosecuted locally, upon
Alvarez-Machain's return to Mexico following Judge Edward Rafeedie's ruling that federal
prosecutors had failed to prove their case against him, the Mexican Attorney General an-
nounced that Alvarez-Machain would not be prosecuted and that the matter was consid-
ered closed. See Schrieberg, supra note 13, at Al.
Although drug kingpins Rafael Caro-Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca-Carrillo have
been prosecuted in Mexico for their participation in the Camarena murder, these convic-
tions have been tainted by numerous reports that during his incarceration, Caro-Quintero
was permitted private cooks, overnight conjugal visits, free-flow access to alcohol and nar-
cotics in a carpeted cell equipped with elaborate video and stereo systems, private kitchen
and bedrooms, luxurious furnishings, and a sauna. DEA agents also discovered the ulti-
mate amenity, a private exit, still under construction, consisting of a 267-meter tunnel un-
derneath Caro-Quintero's cell. See Linda Gomez, Harvest of Death: The Violent World of
Drug Trafficking Has Moved Right Next Door, Lum, Mar. 1988, at 80; Larry Rohter, Mexi-
can Drug Leaders Guilty in Killing ofa U.S. Agent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1989, at B10.
In 1989, Miguel Angel Felix-Gallardo, the leading cocaine trafficker in Mexico, was
arrested by Mexican authorities on narcotics charges. Until just recently, Felix-Gallardo
continued to manage his vast drug empire from a Mexican prison office equipped with a
fax machine and cellular telephones. See Tim Golden, The Enemy Within: Mexico's Drug
Habit is Giving it Shivers, N.Y. Tms, June 20, 1993, at A6.
70. See Busting the Brass, supra note 68, at 25; High-Level Mexican Ex-Officials, supra
note 12, at A5.
71. The battered corpses of DEA Agent Camarena and DEA informant Zavala-Ave-
lar were not found until approximately one month after the abductions. Frustrated and
angered by Mexico's lack of vigor in pursuing Camarena's killers, the United States took
the extreme measure of directing the U.S. Customs Service to inspect all vehicles entering
Mexico at many of the official crossing points along the 2,000 mile U.S.-Mexico border in
an effort to locate Camarena's murderers. The directive to the U.S. Customs Service virtu-
ally closed the border. In addition, the Customs Service inspections hurt business in bor-
der towns in California and Texas. Ultimately, these actions had the desired effect of
prompting the Mexican police to intensify their search efforts and forcing a response from
the Mexican government. The bodies were later discovered, but not until the United
States was forced to take this unprecedented course of action. See Jacob V. Lamar, Jr.,
Deadly Traffic on the Border: A Drug Agent Is Found Murdered, TIME, Mar. 18, 1985, at 23.
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State responsibility to prosecute and punish criminal offenders
within its territorial borders is neither a new nor novel proposition,
but rather has long been recognized under customary international
law. Justice Wilson in the Henfield's Case observed that "[w]hen the
offending citizen escapes into his own country, his nation should
oblige him to repair the damage, if reparation can be made, or should
punish him .... If the nation refuses to do either, it renders itself in
some measure an accomplice in the guilt, and becomes responsible for
the injury."72
The internationally imposed duty to use "due diligence" to prose-
cute and punish criminal offenders within the state's territorial bound-
aries has consistently been upheld in international arbitral decisions.'P
In the Janes Case,74 one of the most widely cited cases acknowledging
state responsibility to prosecute and punish the criminal offender, a
U.S. citizen was murdered in Mexico. Although the Mexican authori-
ties had eyewitnesses to the murder, they did nothing to apprehend or
punish the assailant. A claim was brought by the United States alleg-
ing that Mexico had breached its duty under international law. Ruling
in favor of the United States, the General Claims Commission based
Mexico's liability on the idea that "the Government's negligence is the
damage resulting from the non-punishment of the murderer."75 The
Commission concluded:
The international delinquency in this case is one of its own specific
type, separate from the private delinquency of the culprit. The cul-
prit is liable for having killed or murdered an American national;
the Government is liable for not having measured up to its duty of
diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the offender.76
72. 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1108 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360); see also United Statezi v.
Ajona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (187), where the Supreme Court posited:
The law of nations requires every national government to use "due dili-enCe" to
prevent a wrong being done within its own dominion to another nation Nvith
which it is at peace, or to the people thereof; and because of this the obligation of
one nation to punish those who within its own jurisdiction [violate the Iau] ... of
another nation has been long recognized.
73. See Lillich & Paxman, supra note 53, at 278,88.
74. Janes Case (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R.LA.A. 82, 87 (1925).
75. Janes Case, 4 R.I.A.A. at 87.
76. Janes Case, 4 R.I.A.A. at 87. See also the Texas Cattle Claims, where the Commis-
sion stated that the international duty imposes a responsibility on Mexico beeause by
"knowingly giving the criminals asylum in Mexico, [the Mexican government] encouraged
them to continue their crimes." American-Mexican Claims Commission, Report to the
Secretary of State, cited in State Responsibility for Injuries to Aliens: Diplomatic Protcction
and International Claims, in 8 Whiteman DIG;EST OF INTERNATiON-AL LAw, at 751 (1967).
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In another international arbitral decision, a suspect was arrested
in connection with the murder of a U.S. national in Mexico. The sus-
pect confessed to Mexican authorities and implicated eight other per-
sons in the murder. No one, however, was apprehended or
prosecuted for the crime. The Commission found that "the conduct of
the Mexican authorities in the investigation of these crimes and in the
punishment of the persons implicated therein constitutes such an utter
indifference to the performance of their duties as clearly to impose
liability on the Mexican Government under well-recognized principles
of international law." 77
The duty to prosecute and punish criminal offenders under cus-
tomary international law has also been codified in various multilateral
conventions and treaties. The United Nations addressed, in part, the
problem of state responsibility for acts of terrorism in the Hague78 and
Montreal79 Conventions relating to aircraft hijacking and the Interna-
tional Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 0 The Hague,
Montreal, and Hostages Conventions impose on the contracting states
the duty to prosecute or extradite the criminal offenders.,' In addi-
tion, these three Conventions require the state to take the offender
into custody to enable criminal or extradition proceedings to be insti-
77. See Claim of Dexter, American-Mexican Claims Commission, Report to the Secre-
tary of State 51, at 264, cited in Whiteman, supra note 76, at 755-56.
78. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 10 I.L.M. 133 (1971) [hereinafter Hague Convention].
79. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1971) [hereinafter Montreal
Convention].
80. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, adopted by U.N. G.A.
Res. 146,34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46), U.N. Doc. A134146 (1980), reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1456 (1979) [hereinafter Hostages Convention].
81. Hague Convention, supra note 78, art. 7, 22 U.S.T. at 1646, provides in relevant
part:
The Contracting State in the territory of which the alleged offender is found shall,
if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without exception whatsoever and
whether or not the offence was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall
take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any ordinary offence of a
serious nature under the law of that state.
The Preamble to the Hostages Convention further provides:
Considering that the taking of hostages is an offense of grave concern to the inter-
national community and that, in accordance with provisions of this Convention,
any person committing an act of hostage-taking shall be either prosecuted or
extradited.
Hostages Convention, supra note 80, art. 8, 18 I.L.M. at 1456; see Montreal Convention,
supra note 79, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. at 571.
[Vol, 17:457
Forcible Apprehension of International Criminals Abroad
tuted. 2 Furthermore, in order to ensure successful prosecution, these
multilateral conventions impose on the contracting states a duty to
"afford one another with the greatest measure of assistance in [con-
nection] with the criminal proceedings."' '
The U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplo-
matic Agentss4 imposes yet another affirmative obligation requiring
the state to take all practicable measures to prevent terrorist acts
against heads of state, officials, and diplomats.65 Moreover, in 19S5
the U.N. Security Council affirmed the "obligation of all states in
whose territory hostages or abducted persons are held urgently to
take all appropriate measures to secure their safe release and to pre-
vent the commission of acts of hostage taking and abduction in the
future. '8 6 Fmally, in the 1970 Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law, the United Nations prescribed that "[e]very State has the
duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating
in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another state or acquiescing in
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commis-
sion of such acts."'
82. See Hague Convention, supra note 78, art. 6,22 U.S.T. at 1645.46; Montreal Con-
vention, supra note 79, art. 6,24 U.S.T. at 570; Hostages Convention, supra note 80, art. 6,
18 LL.M. at 1458.
See also European Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, signed in 1977 by mem-
ber states under the auspices of the Council of Europe and affirming the obligation of
nation-states to prosecute or extradite criminal offenders. European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1977, 4 E.T.S. 41, reprinted in 15
LL.M. 1272-76 (1976).
83. Hostages Convention, supra note S0, art. 11, 18 I.L.M. at 1461; see also Hague
Convention, supra note 78, art. 11, 22 U.S.T. at 1647; Montreal Convention, supra note 79,
art. 13, 24 U.S.T. at 572.
84. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York, Dec. 14, 1973, 28
U.S.T. 1975, G.A. Res. 3166, U.N. GAOR, 28th sess., Supp. No. 30, at 146, U.N. Doe. A/
9030 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 U.N. Convention].
85. Id. art. 2.
86. S.C. Res. 579, U.N. Doc. S/RES1579 (1985), reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 243 (19S6). It is
particularly ironic that the U.N. Security Council passed this resolution in 1985, the same
year Agent Camarena was abducted. The lack of diligence by Mexican police officials in
pursuing Agent Camarena's assailants and in failing to locate Agent Camarena until one
month after his abduction would support a breach of this international duty. See supra
note 71 and accompanying text. Cf. supra note 50 (discussing the abduction and torture of
DEA Agent Victor Cortez by Jalisco State police officers).
87. 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Rela-
tions and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Na-
tions, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doe. AIS028 (1971),
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In the case of Camarena, a compelling argument can be made
that Mexico breached its international duty of due diligence. While
the Department of Justice investigation has clearly established com-
plicity by Mexican government officials in Camarena's kidnapping
and murder, the Mexican government has limited its investigation to
lower-level drug traffickers. Ruben Zuno-Arce, a former high-level
Mexican government official, has been convicted in federal district
court for his role in Camarena's kidnapping and murder.88 The for-
mer Director of the MFJP and the former head of the federales' anti-
drug unit have been indicted for this kidnapping and murder."s More-
over, the person hand-picked in Mexico City to direct the Mexican
criminal investigation has been indicted for aiding and abetting the
escape of drug kingpin Caro-Quintero, and other former high-level
Mexican government officials have been implicated in the murder.90
Evidence was further adduced during the Camarena trial of com-
plicity by Mexican police officials in narcotics trafficking. 91 Police cor-
ruption was so pervasive at the time, with Mexican municipal, state,
and federal police officers serving as bodyguards for the drug traffick-
ers, that it was difficult to distinguish Mexican police officers from the
drug thugs. 2 The Mexican federal police were accused of providing
the traffickers with official police credentials and installing radio
reprinted in 9 LL.M. 1292, 1294 (1970) [hereinafter Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law].
88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. (Zuno-Arce was convicted of partici-
pating in the planning of the kidnapping and being present when Agent Camarena was
being tortured and interrogated).
89. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
90. In the most recent Camarena prosecution, a former Mexican federal police officer
on the payroll of the narcotics traffickers testified at trial for the government that the then-
Mexican Defense Minister and former Interior Minister gave their blessings to the kidnap
plot, and that the kidnapping of Agent Camarena was in retaliation for the Bufalo, Chihua-
hua marijuana seizure. At an alleged meeting between drug traffickers and high-level
Mexican government officials, former Mexican Defense Minister Arevalo-Gardoqui stated
that he wanted the bodies buried properly and to hide them where they could not be
found. Testimony of Rene Lopez-Romero, T. 34, United States v. Caro-Quintero, No.
CR-82-422(G)-FR (C.D. Cal. 1992); see also Government's Opposition, supra note 13;
Schrieberg, supra note 13, at Al; Busting the Brass, supra note 68, at 25.
91. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 586; see also Iyer, supra note 50, at 40 (U.S. official
observing that "[i]t is not unknown for DEA agents to give the name of someone [drug
dealer] to Mexican cops and then learn the guy was tipped off and has gone
underground").
92. Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d at 586; see also Government's Opposition, supra note 13
(noting that in Alvarez-Machain's post-arrest statement to the DEA, he stated that when
he approached the Lope de Vega address where Agent Camarena was being held, Direce.
cion Federal de Seguridad Comandante Rogelio Munoz-Rios was guarding the door to the
residence).
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equipment for the drug traffickers to monitor DEA radio communica-
tions. 3 The Mexican military allegedly provided security for drug
shipments destined to the United States and guarded the marijuana
plantations in Bufalo, Chihuahua. 4
Even when a state does not itself engage in acts of violence or
terrorism, or sponsor such acts directly, state responsibility exists nev-
ertheless under international law for "acquiescing in" such criminal
activities. 5 Furthermore, a convincing case can be made that the
Mexican government breached its duty under international law by
"acquiescing in" hostile attacks against a U.S. citizen by providing a
safe haven for drug traffickers, former police, and high-level Mexican
government officials indicted in the United States for complicity in the
kidnapping and murder.96
It is abundantly clear that under international law a state is obli-
gated to prosecute and punish criminal offenders within its territorial
boundaries;97 extradite foreign fugitives if it is unwilling or unable to
prosecute;9s refrain from "organizing, instigating, assisting or partici-
pating" in hostile attacks against another state or the nationals of that
state;99 and take appropriate measures to prevent the commission of
such hostile attacks."° The tortuous history in the Camarena case
makes it abundantly clear that Mexico repeatedly breached its duty
under international law.
While various multilateral conventions and treaties embody prin-
ciples of customary international law regarding the responsibility of
93. Trial Testimony of Government Witness Lawrence Harrison at 13-177, Caro-Quin-
tero, No. CR 87-422(F)-ER (C.D. Cal. 1992).
94. Caro-Quintero, No. CR 87-422(F)-ER (C.D. Cal. 1992); Michael Isikoff, Informer
71es Top Mexican To Drug Deals: Allegations Revealed in DEA Affadavit, WNNsn, POST,
June 4, 1988, at A3.
95. See Paust, supra note 53, at 46.
96. Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force
Abroad, 8 WmHr-rR L. REv. 711, 720-21 (1986) (-It may be argued that a state alao
'harbors' terrorists if it fails to fulfill an international obligation to prosecute or extradite
those within its territory who are reasonably accused of having committed impermizsible
acts of terrorism .... Similarly, such form of 'harboring' may in a given case amount to
impermissible 'toleration' .... ).
97. Janes Case, 4 R.I.A.A. at 87.
98. Hague Convention, supra note 78, art. 7,2) U.S.T. at 1646; Montreal Convention,
supra note 79, art. 7,24 U.S.T. at 571; Hostages Convention, supra note 80, art. 8, 18 LLM.
at 1460.
99. Declaration on Principles of International Law, supra note 87.
100. 1973 U.N. Convention, supra note 84.
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states for terrorist acts,10 1 they remain ominously silent on the imposi-
tion of state sanctions for failure to carry out the treaties and for the
resulting breach of international law.102 Former State Department
Legal Adviser Abraham D. Sofaer posits that "when a state fails to
fulfill these duties, whether it is through unwillingness or inability, the
moral and legal case for an adversely affected state to use the neces-
sary and proportionate means to rectify the effects of violations of
international law increases." 0 3 Therefore, the threshold and disposi-
tive inquiry is whether the adversely affected state may bring to justice
the criminal offender by means of extraordinary rendition when the
asylum state has breached its duty of state responsibility or whether
such action would violate the general prohibition under international
law against the use of force extraterritorially. The next section will
examine the international proscription regarding the use of force ex-
traterritorially, the exceptions recognized under international law, and
whether extraordinary rendition to preserve the domestic security in-
terests of the United States, or any other adversely affected nation,
can be reconciled with these principles of international law.
101. One commentator has suggested that if the treaties embody principles of custom-
ary international law recognized by the international community, they are binding on sig-
natories and non-signatories alike. See Jeffrey A. McCredie, The Responsibility of States
for Private Acts on International Terrorism, 1 TEMPLE INT'L & ComP. L.J. 69, 76 (1985).
102. In the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Eight 103, an explosion of an American
airliner over Lockerbie, Scotland caused the death of 270 passengers on board. The Lib-
yan government is suspected of complicity in the terrorist bombing. On January 21, 1992,
the U.N. Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 731, which urged Libya to
cooperate in the Pan Am Flight 103 investigation and to relinquish its nationals to stand
trial for the bombing. See Christopher C. Joyner & Wayne P. Rothman, Libya and the
Aerial Incident at Lockerbie: What Lessons for International Law?, 14 MiCH. J. INT'L L.
222, 222-27 (1993); S.C. Res. 731, U.N. SCOR, 3033d mtg., U.N. Doe. S/23574 (1992), re-
printed in 31 I.L.M. 731-33 (1992). Due to Libya's failure to respond to these iequests, on
March 31, 1992, the U.N. Security Council passed Security Resolution 748, ordering Libya
to extradite the defendants charged with the bombing. See Joyner & Rothman, supra, at
228; S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063 mtg., U.N. Doc. StRESn748 (1992), re-
printed in 31 I.L.M. 749 (1992). The failure of the Libyan government to exercise due
diligence to apprehend and prosecute the Libyan terrorists constitutes a clear violation of
customary international law. See Montreal Convention, supra note 79, art. 7. The United
Nations, however, is without any enforcement mechanism to enforce the resolutions and
remedy the breach of state responsibility under customary international law. See Joyner &
Rothman, supra, at 257. See generally Findlay, supra note 47, at 28. As of this writing, the
economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations have proved ineffective in forcing the
Libyan government to extradite the Libyan terrorists for prosecution.
103. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Letters to the Editor: The Case For and Against Abducting
Terrorists, N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 28, 1986, at 24.
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IV. RESTRAINTS ON THE USE OF FORCE
EXTRATERRITORIALLY AND THE RIGHT
UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
TO PROTECT NATIONALS ABROAD
The critics of Alvarez-Machain maintain that the exercise of a
state's police powers abroad constitutes an unlawful use of force
against the territorial sovereignty of the foreign state.104 International
legal purists stress that a state is justified in exercising the use of force
extraterritorially only in response to a foreign-armed attack.1" Ab-
sent an armed offensive, if a state exercises force within the territory
of another state to preserve and protect legitimate and vital national
interests (e.g., to protect its nationals abroad, rescue its citizens being
held hostage, or apprehend international terrorists granted sanctuary
by a foreign sovereign), the actions of the state are in derogation of
international law and the state becomes the lawbreaker.1L6 This re-
strictive view of international law goes too far and "stress[es] black
letter at the expense of far more fundamental values."10 7
A. Prior to the U.N. Charter
Prior to the adoption of the U.N. Charter in 1945, customary in-
ternational law permitted intervention by a state to protect its nation-
als when the foreign state was unvilling or unable to do so. It is
widely accepted that "[tiraditional international law has recognized
the right of a state to [use force] for the protection of the lives and
104. See Michael J. Glennon, State-Sponsored Abduction: A Comment on United States
v. Alvarez-Machain, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 746, 746-47 (1992); Kidnapping Suspects Abroad:
Hearings, supra note 6; see generally Abramovsky, supra note 7.
105. See L-N BRONWI.E, INTERNATIONAL L.Aw AND THE USE OF FORCE 13Y STAiS
432-34 (1963); Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: Lw AN-D Fonzwru Pouc 14*9-41
(2d ed. 1979).
The U.N. Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Chapter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
106. See generally Abramovsky, supra note 7. Moreover, dissenting Judge Morozov
opined in the International Court of Justice decision involving the failed U.S. mision to
rescue Americans held hostage in Iran that absent an armed attack against the United
States, the rescue attempt constituted a violation of Iran's territorial sovereignty, and as
such, a violation of the U.N. Charter and principles of customary international law. Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 19S9
I.CJ. 3, 54, 57 (May 24) QMIorozov, J., dissenting).
107. See Richard B. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect Human Rights, 53
IOWA L. REv. 325, 344 (1967).
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property of its nationals abroad in situations where the state of their
residence... is unable or unwilling to grant them the protection to
which they are entitled."'0 8
The right to protect nationals abroad has also been recognized in
international arbitral decisions. In the Spanish Moroccan Claims case,
which involved an international dispute between Great Britain and
Spain, the arbitrator stated:
[I]t cannot be denied that at a certain point the interest of a State in
exercising protection over its nationals and their property can take
precedence over territorial sovereignty, despite the absence of any
conventional provisions. The right of intervention has been claimed
by all states; only its limits are disputed.'0 9
Under the customary international law right to protect a state's
nationals abroad, it is reasoned that while the right of territorial sover-
eignty is viewed as paramount, this right is not entitled to absolute
deference."0 Under the principle of relativity of rights, the state's
right of territorial integrity must be balanced against the competing
right of the other state to protect its nationals abroad."' Moreover,
the right of sovereignty carries with it certain reciprocal duties and
obligations. One commentator has noted:
[I]n international law there are no perfect rights, no absolute rights.
All rights must be exercised prudently with ordinary precautions
without abusing them or exceeding their equitable limits. When a
state abuses its rights by permitting within its territory the treatment
of its own nationals or foreigners in a manner violative of all univer-
sal standards of humanity, any nation may step in and exercise the
right of humanitarian intervention.
1 12
108. PHILIp C. JEssuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 169 (1949). Professor Bowett has
commented that "[t]he right of the state to intervene by the use or threat of force for the
protection of its nationals suffering injury within the territory of another state is generally
admitted, both in the writings of jurists and in the practice of states." BowErr, supra note
57, at 87; see Findlay, supra note 47, at 26; Paust, supra note 96, at 729; Lillich, supra note
107, at 329-30; 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §135, at 309 (H. Lauterpacht ed.,
8th ed. 1955).
109. Anglo-Spanish Arbitrations, Beni-Madan, Rzini Claim, 2 R.I.A.A. 616, 641 (1925)
(trans. by author); see also Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (1928).
110. See Halberstam, supra note 26, at 745. Professor Halberstam argues that "states
should not infringe the territorial sovereignty of other states, but neither should those who
commit horrendous crimes be guaranteed immunity because there exists a state that con-
dones their conduct and refuses to extradite or prosecute." Id.
111. See Bowrr, supra note 57, at 93.
112. A.J. THOMAS, JR. & ANN V.W. THOMAS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965
19 (1967).
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Professor Bowett has further commented that a state that abuses
its right of sovereignty by failing to protect aliens within its territory in
violation of international law should not be permitted to assert its
right of territorial sovereignty when the state adversely affected inter-
venes to protect its nationals."13
B. U.N. Charter
The primary legal restraint on the use of force extraterritorially is
found in article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which states: "All members
shall refrain... from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner in-
consistent with the purposes of the United Nations."
Article 2(4), however, does not provide a blanket prohibition on
all threats or uses of force extraterritorially." 4 There remains strong
disagreement among international scholars and a wide divergence of
views on whether the customary international law right to intervene
for the protection of nationals abroad survived the adoption of the
U.N. Charter.115 Three distinctive theories have emerged.
1. Restrictive Theory
Under the most restrictive view, article 2(4) is construed as a
sweeping prohibition against the use of force regardless of the motive
of the intervening state. 16 Article 51, which prescribes the right of
self-defense, provides a narrowly defined exception to the article 2(4)
113. See BowNr, supra note 57, at 90-91.
114. Under article 51 of the U.N. Charter, a state is justified in using force to repel an
armed attack. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
115. International legal scholars have been engaged in a heated debate over this izsue
for decades. See Richard B. Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Dr. Brownlie
and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in Lmv AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERTN WoR.wD
229 (John N. Moore ed., 1974).
Corfu Channel (U.K.v. Alb.), 1949 LCJ. 4 (Apr. 9), is often cited by international law
scholars in support of the proposition that self-help measures have been rendered unlawful
under the Charter. Several noted international legal scholars disagree. See D.
O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LA, 303 (2d ed. 1970) (observing "[t]he statement of law in
the Corfu Channel Case is not sufficiently comprehensive or precise to w~arrant the conclu-
sion that protection of nationals ... is in all circumstances illegal"); BGo%-rr, supra note 57,
at 15; HANs KELsEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL L-,w 84-85 n.75 (Robert AK Tucker
ed., 2d ed. 1966); Jeffrey A. McCredie, The Role of Law Enforcement In Ertraterritorial
Jurisdiction: Law and Policy Considerations for the Future, 5 EoRY I.-'rL L. RZv. 103,136
(1991).
116. See Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, $2 MrcH. L. REV.
1620, 1632 (1984).
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prohibition."17  Furthermore, an armed attack against a national
abroad is not viewed as constituting an armed attack against the state
for purposes of article 51.118
The jurists and legal scholars that espouse this restrictive con-
struction of article 2(4) reason that the primary purpose of the United
Nations is the maintenance of peace. 19 That end, it is argued, is best
served by subjecting the use of force to the collective control of the
United Nations. 20 The unilateral use of force by an individual state,
whatever the reason, is inconsistent with and serves to jeopardize this
fundamental goal of preserving international peace and stability.121
Finally, in support of a non-interventionist policy regarding the use of
force, restrictionists invoke U.N. General Assembly Resolutions that
further condemn the unilateral use of force. 22
2. Realist Theory
The proponents of the realist theory espouse a more literal read-
ing of article 2(4) and maintain that it does not limit the right of a
state to use force to protect its nationals abroad. Several arguments
are advanced. First, article 2(4) expressly prohibits the use of force
against the "territorial integrity" or "political independence" of a
state. Realist scholars assert that the use of force to protect a state's
nationals in a foreign territory is not directed at the "territorial integ-
rity" or "political independence" of the foreign state. 123 Second, the
117. Id. at 1620.
118. See Maj. Ronald M. Riggs, The Grenada Intervention: A Legal Analysis, 109 MIL.
L. REv. 1, 22 (1985); Jean-Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine
of Humanitarian Intervention: It's Current Validity Under the U. N. Charter, 4 CAL. W.
INT'L LJ. 203, 251 n.208 (1974); BROWNLEE, supra note 105, at 278-79.
119. See McCredie, supra note 47, at 455-56; Lillich, supra note 115, at 236.
120. See BROWNL!E, supra note 105, at 431.
121. Id. at 431.
122. See Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of
States and the Protection of Their Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Agenda
Item 107, at 9, U.N. Doc. A16220 (1965); Declaration on Principles of International Law,
supra note 87.
123. See Paust, supra note 96, at 726 (1986) ("the use of force to capture and abduct an
international criminal located within foreign territory would certainly not be directed
against the territorial integrity or political independence of such foreign state"); THOMAS
& THOMAS, supra note 112, at 16 ("[s]uch emergency action does not impair the territorial
integrity or political independence of a state; it merely rescues nationals from a danger
which the territorial state cannot or will not prevent"); W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian
Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 167, 177 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973) ("[s]ince a humanitarian intervention seeks
neither a territorial change nor a challenge to the political independence of the state in-
volved and is not only not inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations but is
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realists submit that there are two major purposes to which the U.N.
Charter aspires.124 In addition to the maintenance of peace, the
United Nations is committed to the protection and preservation of
human rights. Articles 1, 55, and 56 codify the international obliga-
tion of all member states to promote and protect human rights.'25
Under the realist theory, the protection of human rights is equally as
important as maintaining international peace. 12 6 The use of force, for
example, to rescue nationals held hostage in a foreign state is per-
ceived as advancing a major purpose of the U.N. Charter-that of
protecting human rights. 2 7 Therefore, unilateral use of force for such
purpose does not run afoul of the second clause of article 2(4), which
prohibits the use of force "in any manner inconsistent with the pur-
poses of the United Nations."'12
The proponents of the realist theory also opine that to the extent
states consciously relinquished the customary law right of forcible self-
help, such action was premised on the ability of the United Nations to
implement a collective enforcement mechanism to redress human
rights deprivations and injuries to aliens abroad.129 However, postwar
expectations regarding centralizing authority within the United Na-
tions have lamentably not materialized.'" Professor McDougal has
commented:
[A]t one time I lent my support to the suggestion that article 2(4)
and the related articles did preclude the use of self-help less than
self-defense. On reflection, I think this was a very grave mis-
take .... In the absence of collective machinery to protect against
attack and deprivation, I would suggest that the principle of major
purposes requires an interpretation which would honor self-help
rather in conformity with the most fundamental peremptory norms of the Charter, it is a
distortion to argue that it is precluded by Article 2(4)"); see gcnerally Lillich, supra note
107, at 336; Lillich, supra note 115, at 236-37.
124. See Lillich, supra note 115, at 236.
125. Paragraph 3 of article 1 states: "The purposes of the United Nations are-.., pro-
moting and encouraging respect for human rights ...." Article 55 provides, "[TJhc United
Nations shall promote ... universal respect for, and observance, of, human right and fun-
damental freedoms .... ." Article 56 provides: "All members pledge, thcrmselc to take
joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization for achievement of tha
purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55, Sb.
126. See Lillich, supra note 115, at 236-37.
127. See Reisman, supra note 123, at 177.
128. I&
129. See Lillich, supra note 115, at 238-39; Findlay, supra note 47, at 2.
130. See Fidlay, supra note 47, at 28 ("[i]n the absence of an international body to
protect its citizens, a nation cannot be expected to stand idle and watch its nationals b2
killed or injured"); Riggs, supra note 118, at 30-31.
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against prior unlawfulness .... Many states of the world have used
force in situations short of the requirements of self-defense to pro-
tect their national interests.1
31
Consequently, absent any enforcement authority by the United Na-
tions, realists argue that the customary law right revives and the state
may lawfully intervene to protect the safety of its nationals.132
Finally, the realist theory advocates maintain that the use of force
to protect nationals must be narrowly drawn and only that amount of
force necessary to achieve the objective of protecting the state's na-
tional is justified. 33 The use of force must be consistent with the prin-
ciples of necessity and proportionality. 3
3. Self-Defense Theory
Under this theory, the use of force to protect nationals abroad is
viewed as an extension of the lawful exercise of a state's right of self-
defense. Professor Bowett posits:
that an injury to the nationals of a state constitutes an injury to the
state itself, and that the protection of nationals is an essential func-
tion of the state. On this reasoning it is feasible to argue that the
131. Myres S. McDougal, Authority to Use Force on the High Sees, 20 NAVAL VAR
COLL. REV. 19, 28-29 (1967). See W. Michael Reisman, Criteria for the Lawful Use of
Force in International Law, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 279, 280 (1985):
[T]he security system of the United Nations was premised on a consensus be-
tween permanent members of the Security Council. Lamentably, that consensus
dissolved early in the history of the organization. Thereafter, for almost all cases
but those in which there was a short-term interest in collaboration, the Security
Council could not operate as originally planned. Part of the systemic justification
for the theory of Article 2(4) disappeared.
See also Fmdlay, supra note 47, at 28 ("[t]o require states to refrain from using force in
such circumstances [the absence of a collective enforcement mechanism] would mean that
the Charter-notwithstanding its provisions guaranteeing human ights-affords a great
deal less protection to individuals than did prior customary international law").
132. See W. MICHAEL REIsMAN, NULLITY AND REVISIoN 850 (1971). Reisman states:
"A rational and contemporary interpretation of the Charter must conclude that Article
2(4) suppresses self-help insofar as the organization can assume the role of enforcer. When
it cannot, self-help prerogatives revive." Id.
133. See McCredie, supra note 47, at 463; Paust, supra note 96, at 727.
134. The doctrine of necessity (i.e., "forcible self-help") is implicated when the danger
to the individuals concerned is imminent and the state whose duty it is to protect the alien
is unable or unwilling. A state, however, need not wait for an actual violation to occur
before taking preventive action. See Lillich, supra note 107, at 347-48. The doctrine of
proportionality requires that the state use only that amount of force reasonably necessary
to redress the violation of human rights. See Bow=r, supra note 57, at 93; Paust, supra
note 96, at 728-29; McCredie, supra note 115, at 137.
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defence of nationals, whether within or without the territorial juris-
diction of the state, is in effect the defence of the state itself. s
The international scholars that embrace the self-defense theory
argue that the right of self-defense is an "inherent right" that predates
the Charter." 6 Absent an express prohibition, they maintain that the
customary law right survived the adoption of the Charter. 37 More-
over, the use of force for the limited purpose of defending a state's
nationals "cannot by definition involve a threat or use of force 'against
the territorial integrity or political independence' of any other
state." 13 Former State Department Legal Adviser Sofaer has stated
that the use of force in self-defense, even if constituting a breach of
the asylum state's territorial sovereignty, does not necessarily render
the action unlawful:
Every state retains the right of self-defense, recognized in arti-
cle 51 of the U.N. Charter.
Thus, a state may take appropriate action in order to protect
itself and its citizens against terrorist attacks. This includes the right
to rescue American citizens and to take action in a foreign state
where the state is providing direct assistance to terrorists, or is un-
willing or unable to prevent terrorists from continuing attacks on
U.S. citizens. Any use of force in self-defense must meet the stan-
dards of necessity and proportionality to be lawful. But if these
conditions are met, the fact that the use of force breaches the terri-
torial integrity of a state does not render it unlawful. 139
C. Application to Alvarez-Machain
Under the restrictive construction of article 2(4), since the forci-
ble apprehension of Alvarez-Machain was not in response to an
"armed attack" of U.S. territory, it does not fall within the narrowly
construed article 51 exception to the general prohibition against the
135. BowNrr, supra note 57, at 92.
136. Id. at 187.
137. Id. at 185-86. See also Schachter, supra note 116, at 1633-34.
138. Bowrr, supra note 57, at 185-86. See also Lillich, supra note 107, at 336-37.
139. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Ses.
24 (1989) (statement of Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State)
[hereinafter FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing]. Sce also Glennon, supra
note 104, at 755 ("[iln situations involving state-sponsored terrorism conducted on a large
scale with ongoing dangers that cannot be circumscribed by economic or diplomatic meas-
ures, abduction may be permissible under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter").
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unilateral use of force.14° The restrictionists would therefore argue
that the arrest of Alvarez-Machain was in violation of international
law. Those that espouse such a restrictive reading of article 2(4), how-
ever, must concede that unilateral intervention to remedy a human
rights violation (the kidnapping and murder of a federal agent) in re-
sponse to a breach of state responsibility is at least morally condon-
able.14 ' Any breach of international law by the intervening state
should therefore be mitigated accordingly.' 42
In contrast, under the realist theory the unilateral use of force
would be lawful. The use of force to apprehend Alvarez-Machain was
not directed against the territorial integrity or political independence
of the State of Mexico.143 Thus, the use of force does not run counter
to the article 2(4) prohibition. The extraterritorial apprehension of
Alvarez-Machain was also consistent with a major purpose of the
Charter-the promotion of human rights. According to one
commentator:
[T]he seizure of terrorists abroad for trial in the United States is
intimately related to the protection of U.S. nationals; the apprehen-
sion, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists would prevent fu-
ture attacks by the particular terrorists involved and deter other
terrorists from targeting U.S. citizens.... Thus, while the apprehen-
sion of terrorists may not be as directly related to the protection of
threatened nationals as, for instance, a rescue mission, it might be a
necessary measure to protect U.S. nationals throughout the
world. 44
The apprehension of Alvarez-Machain in Mexico was aimed at
not only bringing one of DEA Agent Camarena's assailants to justice
140. There is growing resistance on the part of the world community to read article 2(4)
as an absolute ban on the use of force to protect nationals. Findlay has commented:
[Nlearly all Western states and most publicists today believe that the use of armed
force to protect nationals is consistent with international law, as long as the exer-
cise of force is necessary to this end and proportionate to the threatened harm.
State practice following the adoption of the U.N. Charter supports this
conclusion.
Findlay, supra note 47, at 27-28; see also McCredie, supra note 47, at 464-65; Paust, supra
note 96, at 728-29.
141. See John R. D'Angelo, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S.
Rescue Mission to Iran and Its Legality under International Law, 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 510
(1981); FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing, supra note 139 and accompany-
ing text.
142. See D'Angelo, supra note 141, at 510.
143. See Paust, supra note 96, at 726; McCredie, supra note 47, at 464-65; Findlay, supra
note 47, at 25.
144. Findlay, supra note 47, at 29.
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but also was specifically intended to deter future violent attacks
against U.S. federal agents as well as American civilians overseas. 145
Narco-terrorists must understand that the murder of a U.S. federal
agent anywhere in the world will not be tolerated.146 Moreover, the
perpetrators of such heinous crimes will be apprehended and aggres-
145. McCredie has stated:
By encouraging nations to take enforcement actions against international terror-
ism, the United States has contributed to the reaffirmation of principles and pur-
poses of international treaties and of the rule of law. If even one terrorist is
deterred from causing destruction, the action of the United States should be con-
sidered valuable to the world community. By utilizing force to bring terrorists to
justice, the United States has contributed to re-establishing world order and has
set a valuable precedent for the future.
McCredie, supra note 47, at 467.
146. In a 19S9 Department of Justice legal opinion, former Assistant Attorney General
William P. Barr of the Office of Legal Counsel explained that at the direction of the Presi-
dent or the Attorney General, the FBI may use its statutory authority under 28 U.S.C.
§ 533(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 3052 to investigate and arrest international criminals abroad even
if those actions conflict with customary international law or unexecuted treaties. Further-
more, the President, acting through the Attorney General, has inherent constitutional au-
thority to order the FBI to investigate and arrest individuals in foreign territory and to
override international law. Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override
Customary or Other International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement
Activities, 13 Op. OFF. LEGAL COUNSEL 195 (19S9); Theodore C. Jonas, International "Fu-
gitive Snatchings" in U.S. Law: Two Views From Opposite Ends of the Eighties, 24 Con.
NELL INT'L L.J. 521, 533-37 (1991).
The issue regarding whether the President may override customary international law
has been heatedly debated in international legal circles. Three distinct legal theories have
been advanced. Professor Paust, who espouses the most restrictive %iew, maintains that
the President has no authority or constitutional power to violate a treaty or principle of
customary international law and that such an act by the President would be ultra vires, or
without authority. Professor Paust also rejects the argument that Congress can authorize
the President to violate customary international law. See Jordan J. Paust, The President is
Bound by International Law, 81 Am. J. INt'L L. 377, 3S7-S9 (1987). Professor Glennon
adopts a more moderate position. In his view, absent Congressional consent, the President
does not have the constitutional power to breach a clearly defined norm of customary
international law. However, when the President acts with the concurrence of Congrezs,
"customary international law has no bearing on the constitutionality of that act." Michael
J. Glennon, Raising the Paquette Habana: Is Violation of Customary International Las by
the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 321, 363 (1985); Michael J. Glennon,
Can the President Do No Wrong?, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 923, 930 (1986). Finally, Professor
Henkin posits that even without Congressional approval, the President may act to sup.-r-
sede a treaty or principle of international law, if the act is within the President's constitu-
tional authority as sole organ in the area of foreign affairs or as commander-in-chief. See
Louis He-nkin, The President and International Law, 80 Azi. J. IN'VL L. 930, 936 (19S6);
Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United State Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclt-
sion and Its Progeny, 100 HAR,. L. Rn-v. 853, 885 (1987).
A detailed analysis of the Department of Justice legal opinion and relevant legal arti-
cles is beyond the scope of this Article.
1994]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
sively prosecuted wherever they might be located.147 Inaction would
otherwise surely jeopardize American lives abroad as well as at home.
Professor Halberstam, commenting on the arrest of Alvarez-Machain,
observed:
[A] rule that would prohibit trial whenever the defendant is illegally
seized, unless coupled with a rule requiring states to extradite,
would put terrorists, drug dealers and others who have no regard
for human life on notice that they can perpetrate the most mon-
strous crimes without fear of punishment as long as they can find a
state that condones their conduct, or that will-for whatever rea-
son-neither prosecute or extradite.148
The apprehension of Alvarez-Machain was also consistent with
both the doctrine of proportionality and necessity. The force used to
arrest Alvarez-Machain in Mexico was limited and reasonable. He
was arrested by Mexican state police officers without incident. Only
that amount of force necessary to effect Alvarez-Machain's arrest was
utilized. 149 DEA agents did not participate in the actual arrest.1 50
The requirement of necessity, which demands an imminent threat
of death or serious bodily harm, was likewise satisfied. In the case of
apprehending fugitives for past terrorist activities, the fear is that fu-
ture acts of terrorism will be committed if the perpetrators are not
apprehended or otherwise deterred. "The imminency requirement
should [therefore] be liberally construed to allow nations to utilize
force to apprehend terrorists likely to go unpunished. Unenforced
prohibitions against violent acts present a danger to the world com-
147. See 132 CONG. Rnc. S1384 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1986) (statement of Senator Arlen
Specter). Senator Specter stated:
[I]f the terrorist is hiding in a country ... where the government is unwilling, we
must be willing to apprehend these criminals ourselves and bring them back for
trial. We have the ability to do that right now, under existing law. Under current
constitutional doctrine, both U.S. citizens and foreign nationals can be seized and
brought to trial in the United States without violating due process of law.
148. Halberstam, supra note 26, at 745.
149. See Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603-04 (during questioning following his arri-
val, Dr. Machain stated that he had neither been tortured nor mistreated).
150. Caro-Quintero, 745 F. Supp. at 603. Cf. Paust, supra note 96, at 727. In the Achillo
Lauro incident, U.S. Navy F-14 fighter planes intercepted an Egyptian airliner and forced
the plane to land in Sicily. Professor Paust noted that the use of force in response to the
terrorist capture on international waters of the Achille Lauro vessel with 28 U.S. citizens
aboard was proportionate and reasonable. See id. McCredie commented that the intercep-
tion was "motivated by the rationale of deterrence and sought to protect United States
citizens abroad." McCredie, supra note 47, at 465. "[T]he interception [like the arrest of
Alvarez-Machain] was strictly confined to the purpose of bringing the offenders to justice."
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munity by encouraging future terrorism."' 1 This point is further un-
derscored by the kidnapping and torture of DEA Special Agent
Victor Cortez in Guadalajara, Mexico, approximately one year after
Agent Camarena was kidnapped and murdered.152 This second kid-
napping of a DEA agent in Mexico was preceded by inaction and
foot-dragging by the Mexican police officials involved in the
Camarena criminal investigation.'- 3
Under the self-defense theory, the forcible apprehension of Alva-
rez-Machain would likewise be legally permissible. An armed attack
against an American citizen is deemed an attack against the state.'54
The state may therefore justifiably respond by the use of force in self-
defense.'55 Sofaer has posited that the threats posed by narco-ter-
rorists to U.S. citizens could support the lawful use of force extraterri-
torially under article 51:
We are reaching the point.., at which the activities of some drug
traffickers may be so serious and damaging as to give rise to the
right to resort to self-defense. The evidence of imminent harm from
traffickers' threats would have to be strong to sustain a self-defense
argument .... But where a criminal organization grows to a point
where it can and does perpetrate violent attacks against the United
States, it can become a proper object of measures of self-defense.'f 6
The Mexican narcotics cartel responsible for the kidnapping and
murder of DEA Agent Camarena, of which Alvarez-Machain was al-
leged to be a member, poses a grave and serious threat to the domes-
tic security of the United States. Through the perpetration of violent
acts against its citizens and the distribution of massive quantities of
narcotics that plague this country, the threat of harm is real andimminent. 57
151. McCredie, supra note 47, at 466.
152. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
154. See Boinr, supra note 57, at 92.
155. Id.
156. FB.I. Authority To Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearing, supra note 139.
157. In addition to the murder of DEA Agent Camarena, members of the Guadalajara
narcotics cartel have been indicted for the murders of two Americans in Guadalajara, a:
well as the murder of DEA informant Zavala-Avelar, under 18 U.S.C. 1959(a)(1). Violent
Crimes in Aid of Racketeering. Vasquez-Velasco, No. 91-50342., 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS
1200 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 1994).
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V. A LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE USE OF
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
In addition to the legal challenges raised under customary inter-
national law and the U.N. Charter, the use of extraordinary rendition
has been assailed on policy grounds. Three policy arguments are
raised for prohibiting the non-consensual use of force abroad. First, it
is maintained that the unilateral use of force extraterritorially to ap-
prehend a foreign fugitive renders the United States a lawbreaker and
diminishes respect for the United States in the international commu-
nity.158 The argument is advanced that the United States should set
an example for other countries to emulate by upholding and preserv-
ing, rather than ignoring and violating, the rule of law. 15 9 Second, it is
asserted that a policy permitting foreign abductions invites retaliatory
abductions of American citizens within the territory of the United
States and endangers American lives.160 The opponents of extraordi-
nary rendition further charge that forcible apprehensions abroad
threaten diplomatic relations and decreased cooperation with foreign
governments.16' International stability should not be compromised, it
is claimed, simply to bring a foreign fugitive before the jurisdiction of
the court for prosecution in the United States. 62 Legitimate and com-
pelling policy interests are thus implicated by the resort to extraordi-
nary rendition.
Extraordinary rendition is an extreme measure and, as such,
should only be pursued in extreme cases. Extraordinary rendition
should not be pursued ad hoc, but should be narrowly restricted and
confined. The following legal framework is offered to limit its use.
First, a state should be permitted to use force extraterritorially only
when the asylum state has abandoned its duty of state responsibility
under international law to prosecute and punish or to extradite inter-
national criminals within its territorial borders. When the state
158. Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Alvarez-Mfachain, quoted Justice Bran-
deis' now famous passage: "If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto itself; it invites anarchy." Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S. Ct. at 2205; see also Glennon, supra note 104, at 756.
159. 112 S. Ct. at 2205-06. See generally Glennon, supra note 104, at 756.
160. See Abramovsky, supra note 7, at 201-203; Glennon, supra note 104, at 754.
161. Professor Ralph G. Steinhardt posits that the abduction of Alvarez-Machain jeop-
ardized cooperation with Mexico in the international war on drugs and on a broad range of
other issues, including the North American Free Trade Agreement. See Kidnapping Sus-
pects Abroad: Hearings, supra note 6, at 40 (statement of Professor Ralph G. Steinhardt);
Abramovsky, supra note 7, at 206-08.
162. Id.
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breaches its duty of state responsibility, the foreign state violates cus-
tomary international law.163 Moreover, when the asylum state pro-
vides the criminal offender a safe-haven from prosecution or, in the
more egregious case, provides financial support and training to for-
eign terrorists, the foreign state becomes an accomplice in crime.'C 4
The state may be in direct violation of international principles of law
that prohibit a state from assisting or acquiescing in "acts of civil strife
or terrorist acts" directed at the citizens of another state.16 s The fail-
ure to act as required under international law constitutes an abuse of
the right of territorial sovereignty166 and justifies the limited and tem-
porary incursion on the breaching state's right of territorial sover-
eignty. When a state breaches its duty of state responsibility, the right
of territorial sovereignty must give way to the affected state's right to
protect its nationals. Conversely, when the foreign state has agreed to
proceed against the defendant locally and is acting with "due dili-
gence" 67 to apprehend and prosecute the criminal offender, the
state's right of territorial sovereignty must be afforded great defer-
ence. The overriding principle is that justice be done, and if justice is
done in the foreign state, so be it.16s In this case, justification simply
does not lie for violating the territorial integrity of the foreign state.
Extraordinary rendition should further be restricted to violations
of the most serious and heinous crimes. While intended as illustrative
rather than exclusive, such criminal offenses include: terrorist bomb-
ings, murder, hijacking, hostage-taking, kidnapping, and large-scale
narcotics trafficking. When an individual is charged with any of these
offenses, the foreign state's failure to act jeopardizes the safety of
American nationals by encouraging future terrorist acts or other vio-
lent crimes.'69 If violent criminal offenders are permitted to go free,
the domestic security of the United States is threatened. tT In the case
of a less serious, non-violent crime, however, the right of territorial
integrity should prevail.
163. See Henfleld's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1099; lanes Case, 4 R.I.A.A. at 87; Lillich &
Paxnan, supra note 53, at 276-307; Paust, supra note 53, at 4S-53.
164. See Hen field's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1108.
165. See Declaration on Principles of International law, supra note &I; Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 78, art. 7,22 U.S.T. at 1646; Montreal Convention, supra note 79, art. 7.24
U.S.T. at 571; Hostages Convention, supra note SO, art. 6, 18 I.L.M. at 1458.
166. See THOMtAS & THoMAS, supra note 112, at 19.
167. See Lillich & Pa'anan, supra note 53, at 278-8.
168. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
169. See Fmdlay, supra note 47, at 29; McCredie, supra note 47, at 466.
170. See McCredie, supra note 47, at 466-67.
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The doctrine of proportionality should serve as yet another re-
striction on the use of extraordinary rendition.171 Only that amount of
force necessary to apprehend the foreign fugitive should be sanc-
tioned. Finally, the decision to proceed by way of extraordinary ren-
dition should be approved by the U.S. Attorney General, after
consultation with high-level Administration and State Department of-
ficials. This procedure would ensure that proper consideration would
be given to foreign policy concerns and would provide for a compre-
hensive risk-benefit assessment at the highest levels of government.
For example, in the case of a terrorist attack directed against Ameri-
can citizens committed by Libyan nationals and sponsored by the Lib-
yan government, diplomatic efforts by the United States to extradite
the terrorist perpetrators from Libyan soil would be futile.172 Further-
more, after assessing the international policy implications, the United
States might reasonably conclude that in light of Libya's long history
of terrorist aggression and its breach of international law in the instant
case, the United States would not likely suffer public condemnation
by the international community if it sought to bring the foreign fugi-
tives before the jurisdiction of the court by means of extraordinary
rendition.173 To the contrary, the proposed U.S. action might even be
applauded by some foreign governments. 74 Moreover, the foreign
policy interests against jeopardizing diplomatic relations by exercising
the use of force within the territory of the asylum state are of lesser
171. See BowvETr, supra note 57, at 93; Paust, supra note 96, at 728-29.
172. While diplomatic resolution is always preferable and should be encouraged, the
aggrieved state should not be required to exhaust all diplomatic avenues if it is clear that
such efforts would be futile. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (terrorist bombing
of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; Libyan government fails to comply with
U.N. Security Council Resolutions to extradite Libyan defendants charged with bombing).
173. International reaction and public condemnation further serve as a check and bal-
ance on the unilateral use of force extraterritorially.
174. A United States military strike against Iraq in retaliation for an assassination plot
allegedly sponsored by the Iraqi government targeting former U.S. President George Bush
was strongly endorsed by European allies. Chancellor Helmut Kohl of Germany described
the missile strike against Iraq as "a justified reaction" to a "deplorable attempted act of
terrorism." British Prime Minister John Major called the missile attack "a justified act of
self-defense." Craig R. Whitney, Raid of Baghdad: Reaction, European Allies are Giving
Strong Backing to U.S. Raid, N.Y. TiaEs, June 28, 1993, at A7. Russia's Foreign Ministry
approved of the military raid and stated that such action was in accord with the U.N.
Charter and "a state's right to individual and collective self-defense." William Drozdiak &
Caryle Murphy, Muslim Leaders Accuse U.S. of Using Double Standard, WAsH. PoST, June
28, 1993, at A14. The unilateral military action, however, was denounced by Islamic na-
tions. See Arab Nations See A Double Standard; Reaction: They Charge that U.S. Ignores
the Plight of Bosnian Muslims While Targeting Iraq, But Europeans Applaud Strike, L.A.
Tims, June 28, 1993, at A8.
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concern when dealing with a nation that sponsors and exports terror-
ism. Finally, if the United States were to tolerate and adopt a policy
of inaction and permit the terrorists to evade apprehension and prose-
cution, the risk of possible retaliatory kidnappings by the Libyan gov-
ernment would have to be weighed against the risk of encouraging
future terrorist attacks. After balancing all relevant foreign policy in-
terests against the government's interest and duty to protect its citi-
zenry, the United States might ultimately conclude that the greater
risk and danger to its citizens lie in failing to act to bring the interna-
tional terrorists to justice. A balancing of foreign policy and domestic
interests by the U.S. Attorney General and high-level Administration
and Department of State officials would serve to carefully limit and
restrict the use of extraordinary rendition and ensure that important
international policy interests are not inadvertently jeopardized.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the 1985 murder of DEA Agent Enrique Camarena by
narco-terrorists, there has been a significant increase in terrorist at-
tacks directed against American nationals. In 1988, approximately
200 Americans were victims of terrorist attacks abroad and 855 acts of
international terrorism were recorded worldwide. 17 The December
1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scot-
land, caused the death of 270 passengers. 17 6 Now, tragically, terrorists
have crossed onto U.S. soil. The recent bombing of the World Trade
Center in New York City resulted in six deaths, injured more than
1,000 persons, and closed two of the world's largest office towers for a
month." Recently, two CIA employees were gunned down and
three other employees were wounded outside the CIA headquarters
175. See McCredie, supra note 115, at 107-OS. This number of international terrorist
attacks represents a 3% increase over 1987 and the highest yearly total ever recorded.
176. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. The 19S9 bombing of an Aianca Air-
lines jetliner took the lives of 110 passengers, including two Americans. Pablo Escobar,
the former head of the Medellin Cartel, has been indicted in the United States in connec-
tion with this terrorist act. While this act of terrorism was apparently intended to intimi-
date the Colombian government and chill criminal investigations against the members of
the Cartel, American lives nevertheless fell victim. See supra note 11 and accompanying
text.
177. Robert D. McFadden, The Twin Towers: The Overview, Jersey City Man Is Charged
in Bombing of World Trade Center After Rented Van is Traced, N.Y. ThiEs, Mar. 5,1993, at
Al; Mike Doming, Sixth World Trade Center Victim Found, Cm Thm., Mar. 16, 1993, § 1,
at 4.
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in Langley, Virginia.7 8 The chief suspect in the fatal shootings is a
Pakistani national who is believed to have fled the United States to
Pakistan. 79 While the motive for the slayings is unclear, one theory is
that the two murders were the work of Islamic terrorists.180 Finally,
terrorism has threatened the life of a former President of the United
States. Former President George Bush was the target of an attempted
assassination by the Iraqi government.811
When fugitive terrorists flee and seek sanctuary in a foreign coun-
try, issues involving extraterritorial jurisdiction and whether the de-
fendants should be prosecuted locally or extradited should be resolved
diplomatically between the aggrieved state and foreign country. In-
ternational cooperation is necessary to maintain world order and
should always be encouraged. Moreover, a state's territorial sover-
eignty should be respected.
The international law right of territorial sovereignty, however, is
not absolute and carries with it reciprocal duties and responsibilities
under international law.'82 A state is obligated to protect foreign na-
tionals within its territory, and this internationally imposed obligation
includes the duty to prosecute or extradite international criminals
within its borders.'83 When a state breaches its duty under interna-
tional law by failing to prosecute or extradite, or by providing assist-
ance or knowingly harboring international criminals, this poses a
special circumstance for the enforcement of international law.18 4 The
asylum state is violating international law.
178. John Dillin, Terrorist Incidents in the U.S. Raise Immigration Concerns, CHRIST.
Sci. MON., Mar. 19, 1993, at Al.
179. Robert O'Harrow, Jr., Investigators in CIA Case Seek Bronco Driver: Other Wit-
nesses to Shootings, Car Used by Gunman Also are Sought, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 1993, at
D2.
180. Bill Gertz, Motive as Elusive as CIA Shooter Conspiracy Theories Rampant,
WASH. TiNmS, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al.
181. R. Jeffrey Smith, U.S. Links Iraq to Bush Plot: Action May be Taken After Kuwait
Trial, WASH. POST, June 10, 1993, at A25; Bill Nichols, Calls for Retaliation After Report of
Iraqi Plot, USA TODAY, May 10, 1993, at 4A (some officials favor extraditing suspects to
U.S., while others want a direct military response); Douglas Jehl, U.S. Cites Evidence in a
Plot on Bush, N.Y. TimEs, May 9, 1993, § 1, at 9.
182. See Lillich, supra note 107, at 344; BowErr, supra note 57, at 93.
183. See Henfield's Case, 11 F. Cas. at 1108; Janes Case, 4 R.I.A.A. at 87; Lillich &
Paxman, supra note 53, at 278-88; Hostages Convention, supra note 80, art. 8, 18 I.L.M. at
1460; Montreal Convention, supra note 79, art. 7, 24 U.S.T. at 571; Hague Convention,
supra note 78, art. 7, 22 U.S.T. at 1646.
184. See Paust, supra note 96, at 726; Halberstam, supra note 26, at 744.
185. See Findlay, supra note 47, at 223; McCredie, supra note 115, at 144.
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While the maintenance of peace and international security is a
major purpose under the Charter,"s the United Nations is also com-
mitted to the fundamental principle of protecting and promoting
human rights." 7 The cause of human rights is not advanced if the
perpetrators of heinous crimes are permitted to go free or seek refuge
from prosecution in foreign territory.s Apprehension and prosecu-
tion of international criminals deters terrorist acts, and thereby saves
innocent lives.1 9 The forcible abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain
served to promote the legitimate interests of justice and humanitarian
rights in the world community.
The first duty of government is the protection of its citizens. This
duty extends to the protection of its nationals abroad. This solemn
obligation of government was cogently described by Supreme Court
Justice Nelson, on circuit, who stated:
Under our system of government, the citizen abroad is as much en-
titled to protection as the citizen at home. The great object and
duty of government is the protection of lives, liberty, and property
of the people composing it, whether abroad or at home; and any
government failing in the accomplishment of the object, or the per-
formance of the duty, is not worth preserving.190
This duty has not been surrendered under international law.
186. See McCredie, supra note 47, at 455-56; Lillich, supra note 115, at 236.
187. See Lillich, supra note 115, at 236.
188. See McCredie, supra note 47, at 466.
189. See Fimdlay, supra note 47, at 50.
190. Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111, 112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186).
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